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Summary
The paper analyses the properties and outcomes of competitive dynamics in industries
characterized by heterogeneous firms and continuing stochastic entry. A formal analytical
apparatus is developed, able to derive some generic properties of the underlying com-
petition process combining persistent technological heterogeneity, differential growth of
individual firms and turnover.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyses the properties and outcomes of competitive dynamics in industries
characterized by heterogeneous firms and continuing stochastic entry. In that setting
aggregate economic variables – such as prices, quantities and indirectly distributive shares
– are interpreted as stemming from an explicitly dynamic process combining persistent
technological heterogeneity, differential growth of individual firms and turnover.
The idea in its essence is certainly not new: indeed it is quite germane to the view
of the competitive process held by classical economists and, later, in diverse fashions, by
Marshall and Schumpeter. Just think for example of the classical view of prices and profits
as attracted by their “normal” level by inflows/outflows of investment, or, conversely, of
the famous Marshallian metaphor of industries as “forests” with young, mature and dying
trees. However, the static bias of a lot of contemporary work has also meant the neglect
of these early dynamic intuitions. This certainly applies to General Equilibrium Analysis,
but also to some extent to traditional industrial organizational economics. While it is
true that in the “Structure – Conduct – Performance” (SCP) paradigm entry and entry
barriers play a prominent role, it is equally true that the analysis, if not entirely static is
at least ahistorical: dates and sequences of events have no visible importance1.
The empirical phenomena addressed by our model have been examined in several
streams of scholarly literature. (A discussion is in Dosi et al. (1997).) There is, first, a
substantial body of descriptive work based on longitudinal data sets with large numbers
of firms and establishments; particularly prominent among these are the U.S. Census
Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988), Jensen
1For example, first mover advantages do not appear among the basic determinants of industry structure
in the definitive account of the SCP paradigm, namely Scherer and Ross (1990).
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and McGuckin (1997)), and a broadly similar data set developed at Statistics Canada
(Baldwin (1995)). A great number of specific questions have been answered by these
explorations. What stands out impressionistically, however, is the diversity of firms and
the sense of continuing, highly dynamic, disequilibrium. The extent of or turnover at the
low end of the size distribution if particularly notable. For example, Dunne, Roberts and
Samuelson (1988) summarizing the general picture have remarked among other things that
“Entry and exit rates at a point in time are ... highly correlated across industries so that
industries with higher than average entry rates tend also to have higher than average exit
rates.” (p. 496) and that “... the market share of each entering cohort generally declines
as the cohort ages. This occurs because high exit rates, particularly when the cohort is
young, overwhelm any increase in the relative size of the surviving cohort members.” (p.
513).
Second, in the literature on “industry life cycles” (for overviews, cf. Klepper (1997)
and Afuah and Utterback (1997)), the principal focus is the unfolding pattern of industrial
evolution over time. Industries and/or product markets are viewed as entities that have
historical starting points, that often have broad patterns of development and ultimately
disappear. Levels of entry and exit, degrees of concentration and other phenomena are
shown to vary systematically within the historical time-frame of the industry’s develop-
ment.
A third relevant literature is that of the “population ecology of organizations” (Hannan
and Freeman (1989), Carroll and Hannan (1995), Carroll (1997)). Empirical work in
the field is centrally concerned with explaining the variation over time in the number of
organizations undertaking a particular type of activity.
The model that follows is meant to explore some generic properties of the processes of
industrial evolution, highlighted – of course with much more historical richness – in the
foregoing literature. It is a “baseline” model in two different senses.
First, a number of important issues are resolved here by quite simple assumptions.
This partly reflects the fact that the paper is in the evolutionary economics tradition,
which generally abjures certain kinds of complexity (cf. Nelson and Winter (1982)). For
example, imputation to individual actors of high levels of foresight and knowledge of
system structure is avoided when simpler alternatives are adequate to explain aggregate
phenomena, and there exists no direct empirical support for the more complex assump-
tions. This approach stands in sharp contrast to more mainstream economic models of
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competition among heterogeneous actors (cf. Ericson and Pakes (1995), Jovanovic (1982),
Hopenheyn (1992)), which accept full ex ante rationality of the individual actors as a
fundamental modeling constraint. In our view, added rationality is added complication,
and the model presented here provides a baseline that will permit an assessment of the
incremental explanatory gain from such complications.
Second, we do expect, however, that some of the simple assumptions will require
elaboration and modification in future work if the model is to be brought into reasonable
correspondence with reality. Hence, the model is a baseline not merely in the sense of
a standard for comparison, but also as a starting point for future work. We anticipate
that many of the results developed here will have at least heuristic value, if not direct
application, in such future work.
In particular, in the following we study the properties of that special case of evolution-
ary dynamics whereby technological heterogeneity is bound from the start to some fixed
menu of efficiency levels. An obvious future extension, straight in the evolutionary spirit,
would be to allow for an “open-ended” dynamics whereby both entrants and incumbents
continuously learn and discover along the way novel techniques2.
After presenting the basics of the model in Section 2, we develop in Section 3 two
dynamic settings, namely a first one which analyses industrial dynamics from the point of
view of the dynamics of productive capacity associated with different efficiency levels, and
a second one which, on the contrary, follows the fate of all individual firms which appear
throughout the whole dynamics path.
An important question is of course whether the purported evolutionary dynamic leads
to some “point of rest”, i.e. whether there is a deterministic limit. In Section 4, we heuristi-
cally discuss this question. While some rest points can be identified under rather awkward
assumptions (including the absence of mortality), this cannot be proved in general.
Our model entails a stochastic system driven by the persistent random arrival of new
firms, on the one hand, and on a systematic selection process linking investments (and
ultimately survival) to realized profitabilities, on the other. Some properties of this system
are analyzed in Sections 5 and 6, with respect to its “laws of motion” and the time-
averages of aggregate statistics such as the productive capacities and the numbers of firms
in business associated with different efficiency levels.
2A model in this perspective, albeit explored only with simulation techniques is in Dosi, Marsili, Ors-
enigo and Salvatore (1995).
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These analytical results are followed in Section 7 by a computer simulation of the
model, showing among other things the dynamics in the number, size and age of firms.
Finally, in Section 8 we suggest some easy generalizations which can be treated with the
technique duggested here and would not affect the main qualitative conclusions concerning
the model.
2 The Basic Model
Consider an industry evolving in discrete time t = 0, 1, . . .. At time t = 0 there are no
firms ready to manufacture, but a random number of firms are drawn which will start
manufacturing at t = 1. At time t ≥ 1 the industry consists of nt firms which are involved
in manufacturing and new firms which enter at t and will be involved in manufacturing
from t+ 1 on. Uniformly for the whole industry we have:
m - variable costs per unit of output, m > 0,
v - price per unit of physical capital, v > 0,
d - depreciation rate, 0 < d ≤ 1.
Competitiveness of a firm represented in the industry is determined by its capital per unit
of output3 Let us designate it by ai for the i-th firm. The variable ai takes a finite number
of values A1 < A2 < . . . < Ak, k ≥ 1. A particular value is randomly assigned to a firm
when it enters the industry.
The productive capacity of the i-th firm is Qit = Ki(t)/ai, where Ki(t) stands for the
capital of the i-th firm at time t. The total productive capacity of the industry involved
in manufacturing at time t is
Qt =
nt∑
i=1
Qit.
(We set that the sum where the lower index exceeds the upper one equals to zero.) There
is a decreasing continuous demand function p = h(q), mapping [0,∞) in [0, h(0)] such that
h(0) < ∞ and h(q) → 0 as q → ∞. Here p stands for the price and q for the demand.
Thus, the price at time t is given as h(Qt). The gross profit per unit of output at t is
h(Qt)−m. Hence, the gross investment per unit of output at t reads λmax
[
h(Qt)−m, 0
]
,
where 0 < λ ≤ 1. The constant λ captures the share of the gross profit which does not
leak out as the interest payments and shareholders’ dividends. It can be considered as a
3Note that the same qualitative results would apply if one made the symmetric opposite assumption of
uniform capital/output ratios and heterogeneous variable costs or both (cf. also Section 8).
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measure for the propensity to invest. Then the total gross investment per unit of capital
for the i-th firm at time t is I(Qt)Q
i
t/ai, where for x ≥ 0
I(x) =
λ
v
max
[
h(x)−m, 0
]
≥ 0.
We shall allow for the industry multiple entrants. Capitals of new entrants take values
from the interval [b, c], 0 < b < c < ∞. A particular value is randomly assigned to a
firm when it enters the industry. We postulate that the initial capitals are independent
realizations of a random variable θ distributed over [b, c].
At each time t we shall allow a random number of entrants for each level of capital per
unit of output. This number is given by an independent realization of a random variable
γ (Eγ 6= γ) taking the values 0, 1, . . . , l, where l is a positive integer (P{γ = l} > 0).
The number of entrants at time t that have the j-th level of capital per unit of output is
given by the j-th coordinate Γtj of a k-dimensional random vector Γ
t. The vectors Γt are
realizations of Γ independent in t. Each coordinate of Γ is an independent realization of
γ. The initial capitals of new entrants at time t with the j-th level of capital per unit of
output are given by Γtj independent realizations θ
t
j,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ Γ
t
j, of θ if Γ
t
j > 0 and are
equal to 0 if Γtj = 0.
Set Θt to be a k-dimensional vector such that
Θtj =
Γt
j∑
i=1
θtj,i.
Thus, Θtj represents the total inflow of capital at t of firms with Aj as capital per unit of
output. The random variables Γtj and θ
s
p,i are independent for all possible combinations of
indexes. Note that in this model we treat the stochastic entry process as entirely exogenous
– in particular entry does not depend on past or present industry profitability. The point
of this assumption is not the affirmative claim that all entry is independent of profitability,
but that some entry is (especially in the vicinity of equilibrium). Many models of rational
entry under uncertainty (to say nothing of models of optimistic bias in entry decisions4),
would produce that result. The principal qualitative result of our analysis would not be
affected by the addition of a layer of profit-dependent entry, though the qualitative results
certainly is (see also Sections 7 and 8 below).
To accomplish the description of this competitive environment we need some death
mechanism. A firm is dead at time t and does not participate in the production process
4More on it in Dosi and Lovallo (1997).
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from t+ 1 on if its capital at t is less than ǫb, ǫ ∈ (0, 1]. The situation without mortality
can be thought of as a limit case of this threshold when ǫ = 0.
We assume that all random elements are given on a probability space {Ω,F , P}.
In the following we shall study the long run behavior of this industry, beginning with
a formal description of its evolution.
3 Two Dynamical Settings
Set Q
Aj
1 = A
−1
j Θ
0
j for the total productive capacity of those firms having Aj as capital per
unit of output which are involved in manufacturing in the first time period, j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
These firms perform the first cycle of production and new firms come in the industry. As
the result, by the end of the first time period the productive capacity q
Aj
1 of firms having
Aj as capital per unit of output reads
q
Aj
1 = Q
Aj
1 [1− d+ I(Q1)A
−1
j ] + V
j
1 , j = 1, 2, . . . , k,
where
Q1 =
k∑
j=1
Q
Aj
1 , V
j
1 = A
−1
j Θ
1
j .
Conceptually, V
j
1 is the total inflow of productive capacity of firms having Aj as capital
per unit of output during the first time period. Q1 stands for the total productive capacity
involved in manufacturing during the first time period. Not all of the firms which manu-
factured during the first production cycle remain in the industry during the second time
period. Those that have shrunk below the minimum threshold have to leave. Designate
by Ej1 ≥ 0 the total outflow of productive capacity of firms having Aj as capital per unit
of outputt. Then the total productive capacity Q
Aj
2 of firms which are ready to produce
during the second time period reads
Q
Aj
2 = q
Aj
1 − E
j
1 = Q
Aj
1 [1− d+ I(Q1)A
−1
j ] + V
j
1 − E
j
1 , j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
In the same way we get
Q
Aj
t+1 = Q
Aj
t [1− d+ I(Qt)A
−1
j ] + V
j
t − E
j
t , t ≥ 1, j = 1, 2, . . . , k. (1)
Here Q
Aj
t stands for the total productive capacity of those firms having Aj as capital per
unit of output which manufacture during t-th production cycle. Also, V jt designates the
total inflow of productive capacity of firms having Aj as capital per unit of output at time
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t, that is, V jt = A
−1
j Θ
t
j, and E
j
t stands for the total outflow of productive capacity of such
firms at time t due to mortality. By Qt we designate the total productive capacity of firms
involved in manufacturing at time t, that is,
Qt =
k∑
j=1
Q
Aj
t , t ≥ 1.
Taking into account (1), we see that this value evolves as
Qt+1 = Qt(1− d) + I(Qt)
k∑
j=1
A−1j Q
Aj
t + Vt − Et, t ≥ 1, (2)
where Vt designates the total inflow of productive capacity at time t, that is,
Vt =
k∑
j=1
V jt ,
and Et stands for the total outflow of productive capacity at time t due to mortality, that
is,
Et =
k∑
j=1
Ejt .
The random process given by (1) and (2) is not a Markov process. However, it turns out
to be one, if there is no death rule (and, hence, firms may shrink indefinitely but do not
exit the industry).
Note that this setting does not account for the fate of an individual firm. Let us
consider an alternative, explicitly microfounded, representation.
Since only the entry process of the model is stochastic, the state of the industry at any
time t is determined given the detailed entry and output history through t − 1 and the
stochastic events of t. Further, the outputt history of the system to any t can be computed
recursively on the basis of prior output history and current stochastic entry. Although
only finitely many firm output levels are relevant up to any particular t, a full realization
of the process involves an infinite number of firm histories. At any time, the part of the
outputt history that has not happened yet is represented by an infinite list of zeroes; zeroes
may also appear in the firm-specific output history because the corresponding firm has
died. It is convenient for the representation to make room for every possible firm that
could come into being; this means that zeroes also appear in the output history of a given
time because less than the maximum possible number (l) of firms entered in some previous
period.
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With this motivation in mind, introduce an infinite dimensional space R∞ of vectors
with denumerably many coordinates. Set
R∞ =
∞⊗
i=1
Rkli ,
where
⊗
stands for the direct sum of kl-dimensional real vector spaces Rkli . Thus, for
every q ∈ R∞
q =
∞⊗
i=1
qi
with qi ∈ Rkli . That is, the infinite outputt history q may be regarded as partitioned into
vectors qi of dimension kl, each of which may be be thought of as output levels of a specific
age cohort, i – where, as noted above, we “make room” in the notation for the outputs
of firms that may not exist in a particular realization because less than the maximum
possible number of entrants appeared in that cohort. The notational convention adopted
is that firms are numbered within types, and then arbitrarily within cohort. Thus, for
example, the firms of the third cohort are numbered from 2l + 1 to 3l. In a realization
of the process, the deterministic part of the output change from period to period can be
represented as follows. As a first step, we define an automorphism D(·) on R∞ such that
D(q) =
(
01⊗∞
i=1D
i(qi)
)
,
where 01 stands for the zero vector in Rkl1 . Also
Di(·) : R∞ 7→ Rkli+1, i ≥ 1.
Let for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, 1 ≤ p ≤ l, and i ≥ 1
Di(j−1)l+p(q
i) = qi(j−1)l+p[1− d+ I(
∞∑
i=1
kl∑
s=1
qis)A
−1
j ]χLi
(j−1)l+p
(q).
Here Dis(·) stands for the s-th coordinate of D
i(·). We restrict ourselves to vectors with
nonnegative coordinates and set I(∞) = 0 for the case when the iterated sum involved in
the above expression is infinite. Li(j−1)l+p(q) stands for the relation
qi(j−1)l+p[1− d+ I(
∞∑
i=1
kl∑
s=1
qis)A
−1
j ]Aj ≥ ǫb
that is, the condition under which the firm whose productive capacity at time i is qi(j−1)l+p
survives to period i+1, given that at i the productive capacities involved in manufacturing
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are described by the vector q ∈ R∞. χLi
(j−1)l+p
(q) is the indicator function of the relation
Li(j−1)l+p(q). We set that for a relation A
χA =
{
1, if A is true,
0, otherwise.
The indicator function involved in the definition of Di(j−1)l+p(·) serves for the following
purpose. Consider at time (age) i ≥ 1 an alive firm having Aj as capital per unit of output.
Let its productive capacity be qi(j−1)l+p > 0 (since it is alive). The question is whether
it will be participating in the next production cycle or not. According to our mortality
rule, it depends upon whether its capital at the end of the current production period is
not less than or falls below the death threshold, ǫb. The investment rule adopted in the
model gives
qi(j−1)l+p[1− d+ I(
∞∑
i=1
kl∑
s=1
qis)A
−1
j ]
for its production capacity at the end of the current production cycle, or, in capital terms,
qi(j−1)l+p[1− d+ I(
∞∑
i=1
kl∑
s=1
qis)A
−1
j ]Aj.
Hence, this firms survives and continues its production if this expression is not less than
ǫb. Otherwise, if it falls below ǫb, the firm dies and never returns to business.
Define infinite dimensional random vectors Yt, t ≥ 0, independent in t. Set
Y t(j−1)l+p = θ
t
j,pA
−1
j for p = 1, 2, . . . ,Γ
t
j, Y
t
(j−1)l+Γt
j
+i = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , l− Γ
t
j
if Γtj > 0 and
Y t(j−1)l+p = 0 for p = 1, 2, . . . , l
if Γtj = 0, also
Y ts = 0 for s > kl.
Here j = 1, 2, . . . , k. Now the evolution of the economy can be given as follows
q(t+ 1) = D(q(t)) +Yt+1, t ≥ 0, q(0) = Y0. (3)
Since Yt are independent in t, this expression defines a Markov process on R∞. Also, since
the deterministic operator D(·) as well as the distribution of Yt do not depend on time,
the process is homogeneous in time. Conceptually this phase space is formed by productive
capacities of all firms which stay alive. More precisely, if q(i−1)kl+(j−1)l+p(t) > 0 for some
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p = 1, 2, . . . , l and t > i ≥ 1, then a firm with Aj as capital per unit of output which came
to the industry at t− i has been alive until t, that is, has manufactured i− 1 times, and
continue to manufacture during the t-th time period.
Having outlined the specific features of this process of industrial change, let us proceed
to its analysis.
4 Some Heuristic Observations Concerning Long Run
Properties
In order to get some intuition on the evolution of this dynamic system, let us start from
some heuristic exercises concerning its possible long run behavior. We can consider equa-
tion (3) as a stochastic perturbation of the following deterministic difference equation
x(t+ 1) = F(x(t)), t ≥ 0, (4)
where F(x) = D(x) + EYt for every x ∈ R∞. There is no guarantee that the sequence
generated by (4) has a limit. But if for some x(0) it does, the limit x˜ must be a fixed point
with nonnegative coordinates of the mapping F(·), that is, x˜ = F(x˜) and x˜i ≥ 0, i ≥ 1.
In terms of our model of industrial growth, it would imply that if the process q(t), t ≥ 1,
concentrates as t→∞ close to some deterministic vector, then it can be only x˜.
Consider the following equation
x = F(x). (5)
Note that first kl coordinates of F(·) are always those of EYt. Hence,
x˜i = EY
t
i , i = 1, 2, . . . , kl, (6)
where
EY tl(j−1)+p = A
−1
j Eθ
l∑
i=p
pi, p = 1, 2, . . . , l, pi = P{γ = i}, i = 0, 1, . . . , l.
Also, taking into account the structure of D(·), we see that
x˜skl+l(j−1)+p = x˜(s−1)kl+l(j−1)+p[1− d+
I(
∞∑
i=1
x˜i)A
−1
j ]χLs(j−1)l+p(x˜)
, s ≥ 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, 1 ≤ p ≤ l, (7)
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where Ls(j−1)l+p(x˜) stands for the relation
x˜(s−1)kl+l(j−1)+p[1− d+ I(
∞∑
i=1
x˜i)A
−1
j ]Aj ≥ ǫb.
Expressions (6) and (7) allow for the following result.
Lemma 1. If there is a solution x˜ of equation (5), then its nonzero coordinates
are exponentially declining in the number of cohort, that is, if x˜(s−1)kl+l(j−1)+p > 0 and
x˜skl+l(j−1)+p > 0 for some s ≥ 1, then
x˜skl+l(j−1)+p
x˜(s−1)kl+l(j−1)+p
= 1− d+ I(
∞∑
i=1
x˜i)A
−1
j < 1
for all possible j and p.
Proof. Since
1− d+ I(
∞∑
i=1
x˜i)A
−1
1 < 1 (8)
implies
1− d+ I(
∞∑
i=1
x˜i)A
−1
j < 1, j = 2, 3, . . . , k,
it is enough to show that inequality (8) holds.
Assume to the contrary that
1− d+ I(
∞∑
i=1
x˜i)A
−1
1 ≥ 1. (9)
Then by (6) and (7) we conclude that
∞∑
i=1
x˜i =∞.
Hence,
I(
∞∑
i=1
x˜i) = 0,
which implies that
1− d+ I(
∞∑
i=1
x˜i)A
−1
1 = 1− d < 1.
Thus, relation (9) leads to a contradiction. Hence, the opposite inequality (8) must hold.
The lemma is proved.
Thus, if q(t) concentrates as t→∞ close to some deterministic vector, then the limit
structure of the industry involves infinitely many of infinitely small firms if ǫ = 0 and a
finite number of firms whose capitals are not less than ǫb if ǫ > 0. Thus, for ǫ = 0 firms
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live infinitely long, while for ǫ > 0 each firm lives only a finite time. Since productive
capacities of the most efficient firms decline in the number of cohort at the slowest rate,
they survive (produce) for the longest time.
Another result which follows from (6) – (8) is the following one.
Lemma 2. Assume that capitals of newcoming firms vanish, that is, for some positive
constants b′ and c′ we have that b = ∆b′ and c = ∆c′ with ∆→ 0. If there is a solution x˜
of (5), then its nonzero elements vanishes as ∆→ 0. Furthermore, set
X˜j =
∞∑
i=1
ikl+jl∑
s=(i−1)kl+(j−1)l+1
x˜s, j = 1, 2, . . . , k,
for the total, equilibrium, productive capacity of all firms having Aj as capital per unit of
output. Then as ∆→ 0
max
j=2,3,...,k
X˜j → 0 (10)
and
X˜1 → QA1, (11)
where QAj = h−1(m+ dvAj/λ) with h
−1(·) designating the inverse function.
Proof. Since
1− d+ I(
∞∑
i=1
x˜i)A
−1
1 < 1,
by monotonicity of h−1(·) we conclude that
∞∑
i=1
x˜i > Q
A1 .
For the same reason we see that for j = 2, 3, . . . , k and s ≥ 1
x˜skl+l(j−1)+p < [1− d+ I(Q
A1)A−1j ]x˜(s−1)kl+l(j−1)+p, p = 1, 2, . . . , l.
Hence, by (6) and (7),
X˜j ≤
A−1j EθEγ
d− I(QAj)
, j = 2, 3, . . . , k.
Now, since Eθ < ∆c′ → 0 as ∆→ 0, we obtain relations (10).
We have showed that
k∑
j=1
X˜j > QA1 and
k∑
j=2
X˜j → 0 as ∆→ 0,
–13 –
hence,
lim inf
∆→0
X˜1 ≥ QA1 . (12)
By (7) we get that
X˜1 ≤ X˜1[1− d+ I(
k∑
j=1
X˜j)A−11 ] + Y
1,
where
Y j =
jl∑
s=(j−1)l+1
EY ts = EV
j
t , j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Consequently,
X˜1[d− I(
k∑
j=1
X˜j)A−11 ] ≤ Y
1.
Since Y 1 = A−11 EθEγ and Eθ < ∆c
′, we conclude that Y 1 → 0 as ∆→ 0. Also, by (12),
the value X˜1 is bounded from below and, by (10),
k∑
j=1
X˜j − X˜1 → 0 as ∆→ 0.
Hence,
I(X˜1+ o∆(1))A
−1
1 − d→ 0 as ∆→ 0,
which, by continuity of I(·), implies (11). Here o∆(1)→ 0 as ∆→ 0.
The lemma is proved.
This lemma allows for the following conceptual conclusions. We see that if initial
capitals vanish, then the most efficient firms dominate the industry. Their total productive
capacity approaches QA1, while the total productive capacity of all other firms vanishes.
Assume that x˜ exists for some ǫ > 0. Since
1− d+ I(
∞∑
i=1
x˜i)A
−1
j < 1, j = 1, 2, . . . , k,
we conclude that for every j and p there is a number of cohort s(j, p) + 1 such that
x˜s(j,p)kl+l(j−1)+p > 0 and x˜skl+l(j−1)+p = 0 for s > s(j, p).
We observe that, if the inflow of capitals vanishes in the sense specified above, then, for ev-
ery p, the value s(j, p) does not change much for j = 2, 3, . . . , k, while s(1, p) unboundedly
increases.
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Indeed, by (10) and (11),
k∑
j=1
X˜j → QA1 as ∆→ 0.
Thus, the factor driving the decrease of productive capacity in the number of cohorts does
not change much for all but the most efficient firms. For the most efficient firms the factor
approaches 1 as ∆→ 0. Hence, if q(t) concentrates as t→∞ close to some deterministic
vector, then in this equilibrium the life time of the most efficient firms goes to infinity as
capitals of new entering firms vanish, while life times of all other firms do not essentially
change.
So far, we have showed that, if a solution x˜ of (5) exists, it has certain properties. Now
we shall look at the issue of existence of such solution.
Let ǫ = 0. By (7) we see that
X˜j = X˜j[1− d+ I(
k∑
i=1
X˜ i)A−1j ] + Y
j , j = 1, 2, . . . , k,
or
X˜j[d− I(
k∑
i=1
X˜ i)A−1j ] = Y
j, j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Now, if we managed to prove that for every positive reals yj , j = 1, 2, . . . , k, the equations
xj[d− I(
k∑
i=1
xi)A
−1
j ] = yj , j = 1, 2, . . . , k, (13)
have a single solution x∗ with positive coordinates, this would imply that X˜j, j =
1, 2, . . . , k, always exist and are uniquely defined. By (6) and (7) this gives that the
required x˜ exists and is uniquely defined.
The following result, which is of the Fixed Point Theorem type, shows that there
is indeed a single solution x∗ of (13) with positive coordinates. (Notice that only such
solution makes sense in the context of our model of industry evolution).
Lemma 3. Consider equations (13) for given reals yj > 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , k. There is a
single solution x∗ of it with x∗j > 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Proof. For v > 0 consider the equation
v = T (v), (14)
where
T (v) =
k∑
j=1
yj
d− I(v)A−1j
.
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Notice that
v − T (v) > 0 for small v > 0, v − T (v)→∞ as v →∞,
v − T (v)→ −∞ as v → QAj−, v − T (v)→∞ as v → QAj+,
where j = 1, 2, . . . , k. By continuity of functions involved, these relations allow to conclude
that on (0, QAk), (QAi+1 , QAi), i = 1, 2, . . . , k−1, and (QA1,∞) there are roots ηi (possibly
not a single one for some of the intervals) of equation (14).
If x′ is a solution of (13), then
x′j =
yj
d− I(
∑k
i=1 x
′
i)A
−1
j
, j = 1, 2, . . . , k. (15)
and
k∑
i=1
x′i
is a solution of (14). Let
k∑
j=1
x′j ∈ (0, Q
Ak),
then by (15) we see that x′j < 0 for j = 1, 2, . . . , k. Hence, this root having all negative
coordinates, cannot be x∗. Assume now that
k∑
j=1
x′j ∈ (Q
Ai+1, QAi)
for some i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. By (15) we get x′j < 0 for j = 1, 2, . . . , i. Consequently, this
root has some of the coordinates negative. Hence, it cannot be x∗ either. Now let
k∑
i=1
x′i ∈ (Q
A1 ,∞).
Then, by (15), x′j > 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , k. Thus, we have showed that if there is a solution of
(13) with positive coordinates, the sum of coordinates must belong to (QA1 ,∞). Let us
show that this solution exists.
If v > QA1, the left hand side of (14) increases in v, while the right hand side is a
decreasing function. Hence there is a single solution η1 of (14) on (QA1,∞). Set
xj(η
1) =
yj
d− I(η1)A−1j
, j = 1, 2, . . . , k. (16)
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Then x(η1) has all positive coordinates and satisfies (13). Thus, a required solution exists.
It is unique. Indeed, let x′ be any other solution with positive coordinates. Since we have
showed that (14) has a single solution on (QA1 ,∞), we conclude that
k∑
j=1
x′j = η
1.
Hence, by (16) x′ must coincide with x(η1).
The lemma is proved.
We conclude that if there is no mortality, equation (5) always has a single solution
x˜. This is the only candidate for the long run deterministic equilibrium of process (3).
The following argument shows that this is not, in general, the case if ǫ > 0. Namely, one
cannot prove that there is always a solution of (5). Hence, there is no natural candidate
for a long run deterministic equilibrium. In fact, such equilibrium should not be expected,
in general.
Indeed, let ǫ > 0. Setting
X˜j,p =
s(j,p)∑
i=0
x˜ikl+l(j−1)+p, j = 1, 2, . . . , k, p = 1, 2, . . . , l,
we see, by (6) and (7), that
X˜j,p = X˜j,p[1− d+ I(
k∑
i=1
l∑
q=1
X˜ i,q)A−1j ] + Y
j,p
{
1− [1− d+ I(
k∑
i=1
l∑
q=1
X˜ i,q)A−1j ]
s(j,p)
}
,
where positive integers s(j, p) are determined as above and, also, Y j,p = EY t(j−1)l+p for
all possible j and p. Now, to prove the existence of x˜, we have to consider the following
equations with respect to xj,p
xj,p[d− I(
k∑
i=1
l∑
q=1
xi,q)A−1j ] = Y
j,p
{
1− [1− d+ I(
k∑
i=1
l∑
q=1
xi,q)A−1j ]
s(j,p)
}
, (17)
where j = 1, 2, . . . , k, p = 1, 2, . . . , l and s(j, p) designates a positive integer that depends
on
k∑
i=1
l∑
q=1
xi,q
in such a way that s(j, p) =∞ if
1− d+ I(
k∑
i=1
l∑
q=1
xi,q)A−1j ] ≥ 1,
and
s(j, p) = max s : Y j,pAj[1− d+ I(
k∑
i=1
l∑
q=1
xi,q)A−1j ]
s ≥ ǫb
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if
1− d+ I(
k∑
i=1
l∑
q=1
xi,q)A−1j ] < 1.
Since the expressions involved in the right hand sides of (17) are discontinuous functions
of
k∑
i=1
l∑
q=1
xi,q,
we cannot use here the argument employed in Lemma 3 to show that equations (17) have
a solution.
To summarize: in a nutshell, while a candidate for a deterministic limit can be shown to
exist – under the assumption of no mortality – that corresponds to the (rather peculiar)
circumstances where inflows of productive capacity through entry exactly matches the
(negative) net investment by incumbents5. Moreover, all firms have “atomic” sizes. While
little descriptive value should be attributed to the existence result – given the restrictions
on which it is based –, it can be used to assess some informal properties of “comparative
dynamics”, which, to repeat, hold rigorously only when q(t) approaches a deterministic
limit (inevitably x˜) as t → ∞. Otherwise, take what immediately follows as an exercise
of “what ... if” character, or, with an undefined degree of arbitrariness, as revealing some
qualitative features of the dynamics also under less restrictive conditions.
With these caveats in mind let us consider some properties of the limit productive
capacity Q∗ on the parameters of the model in the case when ǫ = 0.
Set
Q∗ =
k∑
j=1
X˜j = EθEγ
k∑
j=1
[dAj − I(Q
∗)]−1,
then
X˜j =
EθEγ
dAj − I(Q∗)
, j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
The expression given above for Q∗ defines it as an implicit function of the parameters
involved in the model, namely, λ, v, m, d, Eθ, Eγ, Ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , k. Let us calculate
the partial derivatives of Q∗ on them to assess on what is the influence of these variables on
5Note that, not too surprisingly, the above results turn out to be somewhat comparable with those
obtained in a mode of analysis whereby one imputes to agents an ex ante rationality sophisticated enough as
to sustain, self-fulfillingly, equilibrium paths themselves (cf., for example, Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenheyn
(1992)).
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Q∗. Hence, the analysis is restricted to the domain where I(·) is a differentiable function of
Q∗. Note, that I(x) ≡ 0 is a differentiable function for x > Q¯. (Recall that Q¯ = h−1(m)).
Hence, for Q∗ > Q¯ the following argument always applies. (If Q∗ < Q¯, we have to require
differentiability of the demand function.) By relations (10) and (11), Q∗ < Q¯ if, for
example, Eθ is small enough. Indeed, the latter implies that Q∗ is close to QA1, but
QA1 < Q¯.
Remark 1. Note that if Q∗ = Q¯ we get
m = EθEγ
k∑
j=1
A−1j .
Indeed, a situation such as when Q∗ = Q¯ appears to be rather inlikely: given all other
parameters of model as fixed, one may slightly change either Eθ or Eγ or some of Aj,
j = 1, 2, . . . , in such a way that this equality never holds. Conversely, specifying the
parameters of the model, we can require that it does not take place.
We get
∂Q∗
∂α
{
1− αβI ′(Q∗)
k∑
i=1
[dAi − I(Q
∗)]−2
}
= β
k∑
i=1
[dAi − I(Q
∗)]−1,
where I ′(x) = ∂I(x)/∂x = λh′(x)/vr if x < Q¯ and I ′(x) = 0 if x > Q¯ (also remember
that α = Eθ and β = Eγ). The demand function decreases, hence, h′(·) < 0. Thus, we
conclude that ∂Q
∗
∂α > 0. Similarly,
∂Q∗
∂β > 0. Also
∂Q∗
∂Aj
{
1− αβdI ′(Q∗)
k∑
i=1
[dAi − I(Q
∗)]−2
}
= −αβ[Aj − I(Q
∗)]−2,
which implies that
∂Q∗
∂Aj
< 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Similarly, ∂Q
∗
∂d
< 0. Furthermore, if Q∗ < Q¯, then ∂Q
∗
∂λ
> 0, ∂Q
∗
∂v
< 0 and ∂Q
∗
∂m
< 0 while
∂Q∗
∂λ = 0,
∂Q∗
∂v = 0 and
∂Q∗
∂m = 0 while for Q
∗ > Q¯.
Conceptually, the obtained inequalities can be interpreted in the following way. The
“steady-state” (that is, in the limit, the “equilibrium” capacity) total productive capacity
is positively related to the value of the average capital of new entrants and to the average
number of them. (Intuitively, the result supports the idea, generally put forward in more
static setting that easier conditions of entry yield lower prices and lower profits – other
things being equal and with monotonically falling demands). It is somewhat less intuitive,
however, that productive capacity is negatively related to each of the values of capital per
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unit of output and to depreciation rate – given that one does not allow for any “barriers to
entry” or indivisibility in the investment costs. Moreover, productive capacity is related
positively with the propensity to invest and negatively with the value of price per unit of
physical capital and to the value of variable costs per unit of output, provided that the
equilibrium price h(Q∗) exceeds the variable costs per unit of output. Otherwise, if the
equilibrium price equals to the variable costs per unit of output, the total steady-state
productive capacity does not depend on these three variables.
(As already noted, those observations can be symmetrically reformulated in terms of
the equilibrium price h(Q∗)).
Remark 2. The share in the total equilibrium productive capacity of all firms having
Aj as capital per unit of output reads
s∗j =
X˜j
Q∗
=
1
1+
∑k
i=1, i6=j [Ai − I(Q
∗)]−1
.
Also, the ratio of the total equilibrium productive capacity of all firms having Ai as capital
per unit of output to the one of all firms firms with Aj as capital per unit of output is
s∗i
s∗j
=
Aj − I(Q
∗)
Ai − I(Q∗)
.
Notice that this ratio is Aj/Ai as soon as Q
∗ ≥ Q¯. As above, we can treat s∗j as an
implicit function of parameters involved in the model. Thus, taking partial derivatives, we
can infer the influence of them on s∗j .
5 Entry, Mortality and Long Run Balance Relations
As the foregoing analysis shows, there is little hope of proving convergence of the vectors
q(t) to a limit as t → ∞. However, one way try to study another (weaker) type of
convergence, namely, convergence with probability one of time averages of these vectors.
Start from the statement that in a finite time with probability one there will be born
at least one firm with Aj as capital per unit of output.
Lemma 4. For each j = 1, 2, . . . , k in a finite random time τj with probability one
there appears a firm with Aj as capital per unit of output.
Proof. Note that, since the variable γ is not deterministic, then P{γ = 0} = p0 < 1.
Also,
{τj =∞} =
⋂
n≥0
{τj > n}.
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Hence
P{τj =∞} = P{
⋂
n≥0
{τj > n}}.
Since {τj > n} ⊇ {τj > n+ 1}, we have
P{
⋂
n≥0
{τj > n}} = lim
n→∞
P{τj > n}.
But
P{τj > n} = p
kn
0 → 0 as n→∞.
This completes the proof.
Now let us show that Q
Aj
t , j = 1, 2, . . . , k, are bounded with certainty. Since I(x)
decreases to 0 as x increases, there is Qj∗ ≥ Q
Aj such that
[d− I(x)A−1j ]x ≥ lcA
−1
j for x ≥ Q
j
∗. (18)
If Q
Aj
t were to grow to infinity, then for some finite time instant t0 > 1
Q
Aj
t0
≥ Qj∗.
Dropping the nonpositive term in (1), we get
Q
Aj
t0+1
≤ Q
Aj
t0
[1− d+ I(Qt0)A
−1
j ] + V
j
t0
.
Since I(·) is a decreasing function, then I(Qt0) ≤ I(Q
Aj
t0
). Also notice that V jt0 ≤ lc/Aj.
Hence, the above inequality and (18) imply
Q
Aj
t0+1
≤ Qt0 +Q
Aj
t0
[I(Q
Aj
t0
)A−1j − d] + lcA
−1
j ≤ Q
Aj
t0
.
Thus, Q
Aj
t cannot grow to infinity. This value is bounded with certainty from above and
the bound does not exceed Q
j
∗.
In the same way, setting
Q¯ = h−1(m), Qˆ = min x ≥ Q¯ : dx ≥ lc
k∑
j=1
A−1j
and
Q∗ = min(Qˆ,
k∑
j=1
Qj∗), (19)
we show that Qt is bounded with certainty by a constant which does not exceed Q∗.
Let us formulate these results in a separate statement.
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Lemma 5. With certainty Q
Aj
t ≤ Q
j
∗, j = 1, 2, . . . , k, and Qt ≤ Q∗, where the
constants are given by (18) and (19).
The next statement gives an alternative estimate for the total productive capacity.
Lemma 6. With probability one Qˇ ≥ QA1, where Qˇ = lim supt→∞Qt.
Proof. By Lemma 5 the sequence Qt, t ≥ 1, is bounded with certainty, consequently the
random variable Qˇ exists. Assume to the contrary that Qˇ < QA1 with positive probability.
Then there is δ > 0 such that P{Ωδ} > 0, where Ωδ = {ω ∈ Ω : Qˇ < Q
A1 − δ}. For every
elementary outcome ω ∈ Ωδ there is t(ω) such that Qt ≤ Q
A1 − δ for t ≥ t(ω). Then for
t ≥ max[t(ω), τ1(ω)] (that is, we want to be sure here that firms with A1 as capital per
unit of outputt are present in the industry) we get by (1)
QA1t+1 ≥ (1 + ρ)Q
A1
t , (20)
where ρ = I(QA1 − δ)A−11 − d > 0. We took into account here that Qt < Q
A1 − δ < QA1,
which implies that all firms with A1 as capital per unit of output continue to grow for
t ≥ max[t(ω), τ1(ω)]. Inequality (20) implies unbounded growth of Q
A1
t as t→∞. Thus,
QA1t , t ≥ 1, are not bounded on Ωδ. On the other hand, by Lemma 5 this sequence is
bounded with certainty. This is a contradiction. Thus, the assumption that P{Ωδ} > 0
contradicts the boundness (with certainty) of QA1t , t ≥ 1. Hence, P{Ωδ} = 0 for every
δ > 0, which implies that P{Qˇ ≥ QA1} = 1.
The lemma is proved.
Let us now show that, if there is a death threshold, then none of the firms can survive
for infinitely long time.
Theorem 1. If ǫ > 0 and P{γ = 0} = p0 = 0, then each firm dies in a finite random
time with probability one.
Proof. The death threshold implies that if a firm lives infinitely long, then its capital
does not drop below ǫb. Since the total productive capacity of the industry is bounded
with certainty, we conclude that starting from a finite random time τ with probability
one every newcoming firm dies in a finite time. Indeed, otherwise we would have infinitely
many firms living infinitely long. This, by boundness from below of their capitals, would
imply that the total productive capacity goes to infinity.
At time t ≥ τ consider two firms: one with capital ct and capital per unit of output
Ai and the other with capital c
′
t and capital per unit of output Aj ≤ Ai. Then
ct+1
c′t+1
=
ct[1− d+ I(Qt)A
−1
i ]χct[1−d+I(Qt)A−1i ]≥ǫb
c′t[1− d+ I(Qt)A
−1
j ]χc′t[1−d+I(Qt)A
−1
j
]≥ǫb
. (21)
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Assume that there is a firm living infinitely long with positive probability. Set ct for
its capital at t and Ai for its capital per unit of output. Then
P{ct ≥ ǫb, t ≥ τ
′} = δ > 0, (22)
where τ ′ stands for the time instant when it comes to the industry. Consider a time instant
t ≥ τ . There is a most efficient firm coming at t. Set c′t for its capital. Since we are in the
time domain where every entrant dies in a finite time, also this most efficient firm dies at
a finite time instant t′ > t with probability one. By (21) we get that
ct′ ≤ ct
c′t′
ct
≤ ct
ǫb
b
≤ ǫct.
Since p0 = 0, at t
′ another most efficient firm comes to the industry. Similarly, it dies at
some instant t′′ and we obtain that ct′′ ≤ ǫct′ or ct′′ ≤ ǫ
2ct.
If ǫ < 1, we conclude that, since ct is uniformly bounded from above (cf. Lemma 5),
there is a sequence tk, k ≥ 1, of random time instants such that with certainty ctk → 0
as k →∞. This contradicts (22). Hence, it is not possible that there is a firm surviving
infinitely long with positive probability.
If ǫ = 1, we notice that, since θ is not deterministic, there is σ > 0 such that P{θ ≥
b+σ} > 0. By an argument similar to the one given in the proof of Lemma 4, we conclude
that with probability one there is a sequence of random time instants t′k, k ≥ 1, such that
at least one of the most efficient firms born at t′k has initial capital exceeding b+σ. Then
for tk ≥ τ we have that the capital of the infinitely long living firm at least does not grow
(for the previous argument), but it shrinks at least 1 + σ/b times during the life time of
every new most efficient entrant whose initial capital is equal or greater than b+σ. Since
with probability one there are infinitely many of the latter firms, this again contradict the
assumption that such firm can live forever.
The theorem is proved.
From (1) we get that
Q
Aj
t+1 −Q
Aj
t = Q
Aj
t [I(Qt)A
−1
j − d] + V
j
t − E
j
t .
This implies for n ≥ 1
Q
Aj
n+1 −Q
Aj
1 =
n∑
t=1
{
Q
Aj
t [I(Qt)A
−1
j − d] + V
j
t − E
j
t
}
. (23)
Since Q
Aj
t , t ≥ 1, are bounded with certainty, then by (23) we conclude that (with
certainty)
1
n
n∑
t=1
{
Q
Aj
t [I(Qt)A
−1
j − d] + V
j
t − E
j
t
}
→ 0 (24)
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as n→∞. Due to the strong law of large numbers, with probability one
1
n
n∑
t=1
V jt → A
−1
j EγEθ (25)
as n → ∞. Here by Eγ and Eθ we designate the mean values of γ and θ. By (24) and
(25) we conclude the following.
Lemma 7. For j = 1, 2, . . . , k with probability one
1
n
n∑
t=1
{
Q
Aj
t [d− I(Qt)A
−1
j ] + E
j
t
}
→ aA−1j (26)
as n→∞. Here a = EγEθ, j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Summing up relations (26), we get that with probability one
1
n
n∑
t=1
[
dQt − I(Qt)
k∑
j=1
Q
Aj
t A
−1
j + Et
]
→ a
k∑
j=1
A−1j . (27)
as n→∞. Relations (26) and (27) represent the most general long run balance equation
for the productive capacities involved in the market. They imply that
Q
Aj
t [d− I(Qt)A
−1
j ] + E
j
t − aA
−1
j , j = 1, 2, . . . , k,
and
dQt − I(Qt)
k∑
j=1
Q
Aj
t A
−1
j + E
j
t − a
k∑
j=1
A−1j
fluctuate through time in such a way that on average positive deviations of these values
from zero are compensated by their negative deviations.
However, the results given by Lemma 7 do not say anything about the limit behavior
of time averages of Q
Aj
t or Qt. To study this issue, let us turn to the ergodic properties of
process (3).
6 Ergodic Properties of the Industry
Define B∞ the minimal σ-field in R∞ generated by sets of the following form
A =
∞⊗
j=1
Aj, (28)
where Aj designates a set from the σ-field of Borel sets Bklj in R
kl
j . For every such set A
one step transition probability of process (3) reads
p1(q, A) = P{D(q) +Y ∈ A} = P{Y∗ ∈ A1}χD(q)∈
⊗
∞
i=2
Ai . (29)
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Here Y∗ stands for the kl-dimensional vector whose coordinates coincide with first kl
coordinates of a generic vector Y having the same distribution as Yt, t ≥ 0. The total
productive capacity is bounded with certainty. Consequently, process (3) belongs with
probability one to
L = {q ∈ R∞ :
∞∑
i=1
qi ≤ 2Q∗, qi ≥ 0, i ≥ 1}.
To study the ergodic properties of process (3), we need the following condition, due to
Doeblin (see Doob (1953), p. 192): there is a finite positive measure φ(·) with φ(L) > 0
and a number ǫ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all q ∈ L
p1(q, A)≤ 1− ǫ if φ(A) ≤ ǫ.
For a set A as in (28) let φ(A) = P{Y ∗ ∈ A1}. Then, by (29), we see that p1(q, A) ≤
φ(A). Hence, restricting ourselves to ǫ < 1/2, we see that if φ(A) ≤ ǫ, then p1(q, A) ≤
ǫ ≤ 1− ǫ. Thus, Doeblin’s condition holds for this choice of φ(·) and all ǫ < 1/2.
Now, by Theorem 5.7 (Doob (1953), p. 214), we see that
π(q, A) = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
pt(q, A)
defines for each q ∈ L a stationary absolute distribution. Here pt(x, ·) stands for the
transition probability in t steps, that is,
pt(q, A) =
∫
L
pt−1(y, A)dp1(q,y), t ≥ 2.
The stationary distribution π(q, ·) turns out to be the same, that is π$(·), for all q be-
longing to the same ergodic set $ (see Doob (1953), p. 210). It has the following generic
property
∫
$
p1(x, A)dπ$(x) = π$(A).
In general, it is not possible to find from this relation an explicit expression for π$(·).
Let ρ(·) be a function measurable with respect to B∞ and integrable with respect to
π(q, ·). By the strong law of large numbers (see Doob (1953), p. 220), as n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=0
ρ(q(t))→
∫
L
ρ(x)dπ(q,x)
with probability one, provided that the process (3) starts at a deterministic point q. This
result shows that all sensible time averages of process (3) converge with probability one
to deterministic limits (given a deterministic initial state). In our particular case q(0) is
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always Y0. Hence, the time averages our process are deterministic functions of Y0 (or,
equivalently, of Y∗).
Thus, the following statement holds.
Theorem 2. With probability one
1
n
n∑
t=1
Q
Aj
t →
∫
L
∞∑
i=1
l∑
p=1
xikl+(j−1)l+pdπ(Y
0,x), (30)
1
n
n∑
t=1
Q
Aj
t I(Qt)→
∫
L
I(
∞∑
i=1
xi)
∞∑
s=1
l∑
p=1
xskl+(j−1)l+pdπ(Y
0,x), (31)
1
n
n∑
t=1
νj(t)→
∫
L
∞∑
i=1
l∑
p=1
χxikl+(j−1)l+pAj≥ǫbdπ(Y
0,x) (32)
as n→∞. Here j = 1, 2, . . . , k. By νj(t) we designate the number of firms having Aj as
capital per unit of output which are manufacturing at time t. Also, π(Y0, ·) designates a
random measure taking the value π$(·) for an elementary outcome ω ∈ Ω as soon as Y
0
belongs for this ω to an ergodic set $.
Proof. The sums involved in (30) – (32) are measurable with respect to B∞ nonnegative
functions. Indeed, for (30) and (32) it is obvious, for (31) we have to take into account
that I(·) is a continuous function by hypothesis. By definition of L, the sum involved in
(30) is uniformly bounded from above by 2Q∗. Taking into account the continuity of I(·),
we get that the expression in the right hand side of (31) is bounded from above by
2Q∗ max
x∈[0,2Qast]
I(x) <∞.
Notice that the minimal productive capacity of a firm with Aj as capital per unit of output
which is manufacturing is ǫbA−1j . Since the total productive capacity of such firms does
not exceed Qj∗ for any time instant, we conclude that the iterated sum in (32) is bounded
from above by AjQ
j
∗/ǫ. Thus, the functions involved in the right hand sides of (30) – (32)
are measurable and uniformly bounded. Consequently, they are integrable with respect
to π(Y0, ·), a random probability measure. It takes the value π(y, ·) if Y0 = y. Applying
the strong law of large numbers quoted above, we obtain the statement of the theorem.
The theorem is proved.
Relations (30) – (32) allow for the following conceptual interpretations. The first one
means that the time average of the total productive capacity of firms that are in business
and have Aj as capital per unit of output converges to a limit which is a deterministic
function of Y0. Since
max
[
h(Qt)−m, 0
]
Q
Aj
t =
v
λ
I(Qt)Q
Aj
t
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represents the gross total profit of firms having Aj as capital per unit of output at time
t, the second relation says that the time average of this value converges to a limit being a
deterministic function of Y0. The third relation means that the average number of firms
with Aj as capital per unit of output that are in business converges to a limit which is
also a deterministic function of Y0.
From (26), (30) and (31) we get the following result.
Corollary. With probability one
1
n
n∑
t=0
Ejt , j = 1, 2, . . . , k,
converge as n→∞ and the limits are deterministic functions of Y0. These limits satisfy
the following equations
ej(Y0) = aA−1j − dq
j(Y0) +
λ
v
rj(Y0)A−1j , j = 1, 2, . . . , k,
where qj(Y0) and rj(Y0) designate the values in the right hand sides of (30) and (31).
Thus, this corollary gives expressions for the limit average total outflows of productive
capacities of firms dependent on the other ergodic characteristics of the industry and the
parameters of the model.
An important issue concerns the possible path-dependency of the dynamic. Doeblin
condition implies that events occuring at t and t+n are getting more and more independent
as n → ∞. This ergodic property means as such lack of path-dependency. On the other
hand the limits for the time averages for productive capacities, outflows of the latters,
numbers of firms in business, etc. do depend on the initial state. But the dependency acts
in such a way that the limits turn out to be the same for all initial states belonging to
the same ergodic set. Hence, one can say that there is a “weak” form of path-dependency
governed by a partition of Ω by ergodic sets. This partition, in general, turns out to be
less fine than the one generated by Y0. The conditions of birth of the industry do not
affect the limits of time averages only in those circumstances one is able to prove that
there is a single ergodic set (and, hence, the limits do not depend on Y0).
Now let turn to numerical simulations of the model.
7 Some Results of Computer Simulations
As an illustration of some qualitative properties of the model, let us consider a computer
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simulation6. The run presented below used the following parametrization: k = 2, A1 = 1,
A2 = 3, m = 1, v = 1, d = 0.3, λ = 0.6, ǫ = 0.5. The demand function was h(x) =
4.1667 exp(−0.5x) and the capitals of newcoming firms were uniformly distributed over
[0.02, 0.04]. We set l = 3 and the number of newcoming firms is characterized by the
following distribution: p0 = 0.1, p1 = 0.4, p2 = 0.3 and p3 = 0.2.
Figure 1 shows the dynamic of the price for 1 ≤ t ≤ 50: it tends stabilize rather quickly
around its long term average level, which indeed is below that value at which everybody
shrinks. (Note that this is a property of the price average, while the actual price keeps
fluctuating around this level.)
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Figure 1: Price h(Qt) for 0 ≤ t ≤ 50.
Underlying that apparent stability of aggregate supply, one observes however a more
messy micro structure with a fringe of productive capacity provided by the least efficient
firms (Figure 2), which keep entering and quickly die. Note also that while the total
capacity of firms that manufacture stabilizes rather fast, this is not so for the total number
of firms (cf. Figure 3). That is to say, for a rather long “transitional dynamic” the
“carrying capacity” of the market is not saturated and the relative aggregate stability of
supply and price is supported by a net inflow of firms. In a sense, during the “transitional
dynamic”, market selection operates less effectively allowing relatively long survival time
6The simulation used a program from the Laboratory for Simulation Development (LSD), a package
providing a user friendly environment for implementation of simulation models developed by M. Valente
at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). It is publicly available via Internet.
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also for less efficient firms and persistent “early moves advantages”.
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Figure 2: Productive capacities Qt, Q
A1
t and Q
A2
t for 0 ≤ t ≤ 50.
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Figure 3: Numbers of firms in business for 0 ≤ t ≤ 500.
Skewed size distributions appear from early on and remain thereafter (Figures 4 and
5), although – given the very simplified assumptions of our model (including the absence
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Figure 4: Size distribution of firms for t = 50.
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Figure 5: Size distribution of firms for t = 500.
of learning by incumbents) – long-term skewness falls as compared to the “transitional”
phase. When both production capacity and number of firms approach their stationary
regimes, the competitive presure prevents all firms (including the most efficient ones)
from expanding indefinitely. Relatedly, the ensuing age distribution (cf. Figures 6 and 7)
assures that even the most efficient firms are bound to disappear in the long term. Indeed,
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Figure 6: Age distribution of firms for t = 50.
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Figure 7: Age distribution of firms for t = 500.
the picture is very similar to the Marshallian view of the “forest”, mentioned earlier, with
a persistent turnover of trees (with, of course, the marginal fringe having the highest
turnover rates).
Note also that the foregoing qualitative properties hold across different parametriza-
tions of the model, although long-term averages and the length of the “transitional dy-
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namics” depend of course on the parametrization itself.
8 Generalizations of the Model
Let us consider some possible generalizations of the basic model presented above, which can
be studied by essentially the same analytic means, without affecting the major qualitative
conclusions.
1. On purpose, in the foregoing exercise we have kept the behavioral assumptions
to a minimum. In that vein, we have ruled out also any feedback from profitability to
investment rules. However the qualitative properties of the model would not be affected if
one allowed rate of investment to fall when the price gets close to variable costs per unit
of output. In that case one would just set gross investment per unit of output at t as
λmax
[
h(Qt)−m, 0
]
if h(Qt)−m > δ
and
(λ− η)max
[
h(Qt)−m, 0
]
if h(Qt)−m ≤ δ,
where λ ∈ (0, 1], η ∈ [0, λ). Here δ gives a threshold of profitability when the investment
policy changes.
2. The death criterion could be dependent on the total productive capacity at time t.
Namely, the i-th firm is dead at time t and does not participate in the evolution of the
market from t on if its productive capacity Qit at t is less than ǫQt. Here ǫ ∈ (0, 1) is some
threshold value.
3. One can allow also variable costs to vary across firms. Assume that there are
n > 1 possible levels of variable costs per unit of outputt mj, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Allowing
as above multiple entrants, we postulate that at time t ≥ 0 the number of newcoming
firms which have Ai as output/capital ratio and mj as variable costs is given by Γ
t
n(i−1)+j
the n(i − 1) + j-th coordinate of Γt. Here Γt, t ≥ 0, are independent realizations of a
n× k dimensional vector Γ whose coordinates are independent realizations of the random
variable γ defined in Section 2. Initial capitals of these firms are given by Γn(i−1)+j
independent realizations of the random variable θ. Moreover, initial capitals for different
time instants are independent and they do not depend upon the number of newcoming
firms.
4. Initial capitals of newcoming firms may depend on their capital/output ratios and
their variable costs. Thus, instead of a single random variable θ, we may consider a
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collection of them, θi,j, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. (Each of these variables is assumed to have
a bounded support).
5. One can make p0 the probability of “not to enter” dependent upon how close the
current price is to the variable costs of the firm which is deciding whether to enter or not.
Let φj(·) be a decreasing function mapping [0,∞) to [0, βj], βj ∈ (0, 1], j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
For example, φj(x) = exp(−φjx), φj > 0. Then the distribution of the random variable
γti,j(Qt) governing the number of firms with the output/capital ratio Ai and the variable
costs mj that enter the market at t can be as follows
γti,j(x) =


0 with probability p
(i)
0 φj(max[h(x)−mj, 0]),
s with probability 1−
p
(i)
s p
(i)
0
1−p
(i)
0
{1− φj(max[h(x)−mj, 0])},
where 0 ≤ p
(i)
0 < 1, p
(i)
s ≥ 0, 1 ≤ s ≤ l(i)− 1, p
(i)
l(i)
> 0,
∑l(i)
s=0 p
(i)
s = 1. By l(i) we designate
the maximum feasible number of entrants with Ai as the capital per unit of output, hence
p
(i)
l(i)
> 0. The random variables γti,j(·) are assumed to be stochastically independent in
each of the indexes.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a formal analytical apparatus able to treat the dynamics
of industrial evolution and derive some generic properties of the underlying competition
process. The continuing entry flow produces a continuing turnover in the firm population
of the sort observed in real data. The size distribution of firms emerges as a derivative
consequence of the combination of heterogeneity and turnover. Although “snapshots”
of the distribution at different points in time might be similar (after the industry has
approached its long term dynamic path), the firms occupying particular places in the
distribution are generally different. This does not only apply to the lower end of the
distribution, but to the whole universe of firms: in fact, we proved, under quite general
conditions, that all firms are bound to die in a finite random time with probability one.
Moreover, the long-run proportions of firms of different efficiency levels reflect the
interplay of selection forces and entry rates in a fashion roughly analogous to the analysis
of gene frequencies provided by the Hardy – Weinberg laws of population biology7.
7The Hardy – Weinberg laws provide a quantitative statement of the fact that “deleterious” genes are
continuously eliminated from the population by natural selection forces, but are replenished by mutation
(see Wilson and Bossert (1971)).
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The view of the outcomes of the competition process, in a sense, is a formal vindica-
tion of the intuition of classical economists that conditions of entry and (heterogeneous)
techniques of production determine some sort of “centers of gravity” around which actual
prices, quantities and profitabilities persistently fluctuate. Indeed, on the ground of the
foregoing model, one is able to establish the limit properties of those time averages.
As mentioned earlier, the model is suitable to several extensions. An obvious one is the
account of an endogenous process of arrival of new techniques and, hence, new productivity
levels.
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